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CASE NOTES
At any rate, the Supreme Court's determinations in the several Brown-Olds
cases"' presently pending before it, whether or not in accord with the views
submitted above, will be, at least, conclusive of the issues herein portrayed.
RALPH C. GOOD, JR.
Negotiable Instruments—Rights of a Payee in a Misdelivered Check.—
Denver Electric E.1 Neon Service Corp. v. Gerald H. Pbipps,
Defendant Phipps drew two checks payable to plaintiff electric company
which were unaccountably delivered to another electric company. The
recipient company endorsed the checks in its own name and deposited them
in its depositary bank. The bank, in turn, collected the amounts of the
checks from the drawee bank. Payee instituted suit, joining the drawer, the
drawee bank, the collecting bank and the recipient company as parties de-
fendant. The claim against the drawer was posited on two grounds: (1) on
a negligence theory for misdelivery of the checks; and (2) on an indebt-
edness in the total amount of the checks "on an account stated."2 The
claims against the collecting bank, the drawee bank and the recepient com-
pany were grounded in theories both of conversion and money had and
received. 2 Defendant-drawer moved for dismissal of the claim against him.
The trial court granted the motion and the Supreme Court of Colorado
affirmed. HELD: By suing the collecting bank, the payee ratified and adopted
the payment and collection of the checks, and, having thus acquired a right
to recover from the collecting bank in the amount represented by the checks
on a theory of money had and received, can make no present showing of
damage on which to predicate a negligence claim against the drawer. 4 In
addition, a count alleging indebtedness in the amount of the checks "on an
account stated" is essentially an action on the checks, and, as such, in-
sufficient where the checks have been in law discharged with the payee's
ratification and adoption of their payment and collection. United States
Portland Cement Co. v. United States National Bank 5 is approved, and
29 Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. N.L.R.B., 273 F.2d 699 (7th Cir.
1960), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 837 (1960) (This case is contra the holding in the principal
case.); N.L.R.B. v. Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 275 F.2d 646
(D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 837 (1960). The Board has filed petitions for
writs of certiorari in the principal case, as noted supra note 1, and in the case of
N.L.R.B. v. American Dredging Co., 276 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1960). All of these cases
involve the Brown-Olds remedy. The Supreme Court's determinations in the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters case, which was argued before it on March 1, 1961, should
produce the conclusive declaration of the proper limits of Brown-Olds relief.
1. 354 P.2d 618 (Colo. 1960).
2 Id. at 620. In the words of the court: "Claim 9 merely alleges an indebtedness
based upon an account stated by Phipps for the total sum represented by the two
checks."
a Under an amended complaint claims against the drawee bank were eliminated.
4 The dismissal of the negligence count was without prejudice to a latter refiling if
damage could then be shown.
5 61 Colo. 334, 157 Pac. 202 (1916).
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extended to control in situations where a check is unendorsed by the payee
as well as in instances where the payee's signature is forged or unauthorized.
When a check has been collected through the bank collection process
bearing the forged or otherwise unauthorized signature of the payee, he has
two remedial courses of action. He may elect to treat the entire transaction
as a nullity, and proceed against the drawer on the original obligation .° On
the other hand, he may choose to enforce his rights in the instrument itself.
This latter remedy usually involves proceeding against the collecting bank,
either in tort for conversion or in quasi-contract for money had and re-
ceived.' The conversion theory rests on the thesis that the collecting bank's
exercise of control in accepting the check and collecting on it is in contraven-
tion of the payee's property right .° The quasi-contract theory is predicated
on a ratification of the series of transactions which culminates in receipt of
the proceeds of the check by the collecting bank from the drawee bank, as
a result of which the collecting bank is regarded as holding money belonging
to the payee.°
6 NIL § 23; UCC § 3-404.
7 Money had and received: A. Paul Goodall Real E. & I. Co. v. North Birmingham
A. Bank, 225 Ala. 507, 114 So. 7 (1932); Merchants' & Manufacturers' Assn v. First
Nat'l Bank of Mesa, 40 Ariz. 531, 14 P.2d 717 (1932); Schaap v. State Nat'l Bank of
Texarkana, 137 Ark. 251, 208 S.W. 309 (1918); George v. Security Trust & Savings
Bank, 91 Cal. App. 708, 267 Pac. 560 (1928); Buena Vista Oil Co. v. Park Bank of
Los Angeles, 39 Cal. App. 710, 180 Pac. 12 (1919); United States Portland Cement Co.
v. United States Nat'l Bank, 61 Colo. 334, 157 Pac. 202 (1916) ; Independent Oil
Men's Ass'n v. First Dearborn Nat'l Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 142 N.E. 458 (1924); Universal
Carloading & Distributing Co. v. South Side Bank, 224 Mo. App. 876, 27 S.W.2d 768
(1930); Passaic-Bergen Lumber Co. v. United States Trust Co., 10 N.J.L. 315, 164 Atl.
580 (1933).
Conversion: Walsh v. American Trust Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 654, 47 P.2d 323 (1935);
Good Roads Machinery Co. v. Broadway Bank, 267 S.W. 40 (Mo. 1924) ; Evenson v.
Waukesha Nat'l Bank, 189 Wis. 179, 207 N.W. 415 (1926).
Conversion or money had and received: National Union Bank of Maryland v.
Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md. 449, 129 Atl. 688 (1924); Central Trust Co. v. Backsman,
50 Ohio App. 512, 198 N.E. 730 (1935); Zidek v. Forbes Nat'l Bank, 159 Pa. Super. 442,
48 A.2d 103 (1946); Lindsley v. First Nat'l Bank of Philadelphia, 325 Pa. 393, 190 Atl.
876 (1937).
8 ". . where a bank receives a check bearing the forged endorsement of the payee,
collects it and accounts for it to its depositor (not the payee) it is guilty of a conversion
for which it is liable directly to the payee ... " Zidek v. Forbes Nat'l Bank, supra note
7, at 444, 48 A.2d at 104.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 3-409(1), payment on a forged instrument
is specifically made a conversion. However, § 3-409(3) exempts from liability a collecting
bank which in good faith and in accordance with reasonable business standards deals with
the instrument or its proceeds, where such bank no longer has in its possession the instru-
ment or any of its proceeds.
9 ".	 the plaintiff seeks, as we think he has the right to do, to ratify the col-
lection of the check for him; in such case he ratifies the assumed payment of it,
and the check is then paid; the drawee bank and the maker thereof are both
released from paying it over again; the payee would be estopped from making
such claim. The ratification is not upon the acceptance alone of the check by the
drawee bank, but upon its collection by the defendant in error bank and pay-
ment by the drawee bank, all of which are ratified by the payee, and the suit
is then against the collecting bank as for moneys had and received."
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Of necessity, these actions against a collecting bank presuppose that
the payee has enforceable rights in the instrument. Under both the Negotiable
Instruments Law and the Uniform Commercial Code delivery of the instru-
ment to the payee is an essential prerequisite to the vesting of any such
rights.10
 In all cases where recovery has been permitted against a collecting
bank, including the United States Portland Cement case relied on in the
principal case, delivery was made either directly to the payee or to his
agent." In the principal case, however, no delivery to the payee was made.
Factually closer to the principal case on the issue of delivery was Jones
v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n. 12 There the drawer's office
manager forged the payee's name on checks and collected upon them through
the banks. Upon learning of the transaction the payee brought suit against
the collecting bank only to be precluded from ratifying the collection and
payment of the checks and suing on the instruments, the court concluding
that ". . . if there was no delivery of the checks to the customers [payees],
then they remained the property of the brokers [drawers] .'" 3
The Colorado court in the principal case would have been well-advised
to follow the sound approach adopted in Jones. Instead, it rested its decision
upon a sub silentio holding that delivery of the instrument to the payee is
unnecessary in order to vest in him the requisite rights with respect to the
instrument which would confer standing to sue the collecting bank. Such a
holding is clearly untenable. Without delivery of the instrument to the
payee he has no property right in it to be converted. A money had and
received theory is equally unauthorized in that it requires ratification of a
transaction in which the payee has no interest, in the absence of any rights
in the subject-matter of the transaction. All this would be clear enough if,
for example, a check was drawn with the intention of withholding it from
the payee until a certain condition was fulfilled, only to have the check
stolen from the drawer prior to that time. In that instance, assuming the
thief successfully cashed the check at a bank which collected the represented
amount of money from the drawee bank, it is extremely unlikely that the
Colorado court would permit the payee to step in and sue the collecting
bank. Yet such a result would be logically consistent with the holding of the
principal case.
United States Portland Cement Co. v. United States National Bank, supra note 3, at
338-39, 157 Pac. at 204.
10 NIL § 16; UCC §§ 3-201, 3-202. See also UCC § 3-306(c) which provides that
even where one is a holder, if he is not a holder in due course he takes the instrument
subject to the defense of nondelivery.
11 See supra note 7. But see Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y.
27, 100 N.E.2d 117 (1951), criticized in 37 Cornell L.Q. 310 (1951).
12 49 Cal. App, 2d 115, 121 P.2d 94 (1942).
18 Id. at 120, 121 P.2d at 97. Accord, People v. Kasper American State Bank, 364
III. 121, 4 N.E.2d 14 (1936); Home Indemnity Co. v. State Bank of Fort Dodge 233
Iowa 103, 8 N.E.2d 757 (1943); Gallup v. Barton, 313 Mass. 379, 47 N.E.2d 921
(1943); Reese v. State, 192 Miss. 147, 5 So. 2d 236 (1941); See also Britton, Bills and
Notes, § 87, p. 343 (1943). Contra, Crisp v. State Bank of Rolla, 32 N.D. 263, I55
N.W. 78 (1915).
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If the payee has no standing to sue on any theory based on rights in the
instrument he would then be obliged to rely exclusively on the original
obligation. It would appear that this was the gravamen of the count alleging
indebtedness "on an account stated,"14 although the court construed it as
an action on the checks themselves. Had the court regarded this claim as
one arising from the original obligation, this would have put an immediate
end to the case and effectively avoided the subsequent litigation devolving
from this decision.
FRANCIS J. LAWLER
Negotiable Instruments—Signature in Representative Capacity—Ad-
missibility of Parol Evidence.—Norman v. Beling.1—Plaintiff, holder in
due course of a series of promissory notes, sought to recover from the de-
fendant who, with another, had signed the notes below the name of a cor-
poration without giving any indication of representative capacity.
The form of the notes was as follows:
IL
. . . After Date We Promise to Pay .. .
Teal Corporation
J. Harold Samar
Christopher A. Baling" •
The notes were a printed form, with "We" and "Teal Corporation"
typed in and the signatures were handwritten. The trial court ruled that
there existed a patent ambiguity on the face of the instruments and, on the
basis of parol evidence which it admitted in order to resolve the ambiguity,
found that the defendant had signed the note only in a representative capacity
and was therefore not liable as a co-maker. The Superior Court, Appellate
Division, reversed, holding that the instruments revealed unambiguously
that defendant bound himself individually on the instruments. 2
 The New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the
judgment of the trial court. HELD: The signatures on each note created an
ambiguity on the face of the instrument, since a reasonably prudent man
would be unable to determine from the signatures, with any degree of
certainty, the status of the individual signers and therefore parol evidence
could be used to resolve the ambiguity.
Under the parol evidence rule as applied to negotiable instruments,
when commercial paper has on its face an ambiguity apparent to a reasonably
prudent man, proof of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution
of the instrument may be introduced to aid in its construction. 3
 The courts
14 Supra note 2.
1 33 N.J. 237, 163 A.2d 129 (1960).
2 58 N.J. Super. 575, 157 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1959).
3 Canton Provision Co. v. Chancy, 70 N.E.2d 687 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945); Germania
Nat'l Bank v. Mariner, 129 Wis. 544, 109 N.W. 574 (1906); UCC 3f 3-403(2)(b) and
Comment 3 thereto.
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